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STUDENT NOTES
of a trust seems hard to substantiate when one tries to point out the
trust res, except in some cases where the money is paid into the court
-as in the principal case. We venture to submit that the practice be
-called: a rule of convenience to avoid circuity of action. One court
has had this to say, "by following it (referring to-allowing the third
:party to sue) one action often effects the same result that two would
be required to accomplish without it."' But most courts are content
to consider the right as a matter of fact and let it go at that.
In conclusion, we submit that, generally speaking, the law is
,settled that a creditor beneficiary for whose implied benefit a contract is made may sue thereon in his own name, and that the question
has ceased to be a question of law but merely a matter of construing
-the agreement of the parties.
FOREST J. NEEL.

INFANTS-RIGHT TO CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF INFANT.
The matter of custody of an infant child has long been a problem
-to the courts. This is true, not because of a great discrepancy in prior
-decisions upon the subject, but because succeeding generations have
recognized the weaknesses prevalent in the old system of laws on
Infants and have sought to better them. Courts have, as always, hesi,tated to branch out upon a new line of thought. They have clung
-tenaciously to the idea that the family, being the foundation of civilization, should never be disturbed, and that the parent is the supreme
-ruler of the destinies of his children. The courts at early common law,
'ailed to recognize a right of control in the mother, but placed the
,entire matter in the hands of the father.' It has been quite a struggle
'for the courts even with the aid of statutes to avoid following this
rule. In the early cases, even where the father was leading a life of
2
Gradually
-open- profligacy, he was given custody of his children.
,considering the statutes and the discretionary power of the courts, it
'has come to be the rule that the welfare of the infant is the chief
consideration in controversies of this kind and courts will give the
-custody of the child to either father or mother and sometimes will
deny to both of them the custody of their children.' Neither father
'nor mother has any right that can be allowed to seriously militate
ugainst the welfare of the child. If the father be unfit to have the
-custody of his child the courts will promptly declare his rights for2T Ellis v. Harrison,104 Mo. 279, at p. 671, 16 S. W. 198, at p. 199
(1891).
'People v. Mercein, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 399 (1842).
2
Ball v. Ball, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 54 (1851).
sPryse v. Thayer, 85 Ran. 566, 118 Pac. 56 (1911); Chance v.
P'gneguy, 212 Ky. 430, 279 S. W. 640 (1926); Moore v. Smith, 228 Ky.
286, 14 S. W. (2d) 1072 (1929).
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feited; likewise as to the mother.' As has been said, in such a case
the child may be awarded to a third person. Kentucky follows this
rule also.5 However, as between father and mother the tendency of
the courts is to give the custody of very young children to their mother,.
especially in cases of divorce or where the father is unfit or unableto provide for them8 But where it is for the best interests of the.
child, its custody will be awarded to the father.
Even though the courts have progressed a long way from the earlyb
common law rule they are still reluctant to decree a separation of
parent and child and will do so only when proof of a parent's unfitness
is clear and convincing. The unfitness which will deprive a parent or
the right to the custody of his minor child must be positive and not
comparative and the mere fact that the minor child might be better
cared for by a third person is not sufficient to deprive the parent of
his or her right to its custody.
There has been much written on the subject of forfeiture of
custody of the infant by contract. The decisions show a confusion and
uncertainty on the part of the courts as to the validity of such a contract. As a general rule, however, it may be stated that a parent does
mot necessarily forfeit the right to custody of the child merely because he or she, by force of circumstances places the child in the
care of another.' An agreement by one parent for the disposal of the
custody of his children is binding on him alone and not upon the
other."
Kentucky holds that a contract made by the mother for the disposition of her child, made during coverture, is void." It has also.
been held that the custody of a minor given by virtue of a fair agreement with the parent, and not prejudicial to the welfare of the minor,
although not binding on the parent, is not unlawful or against public
policy so as to constitute such an illegal restraint as the court must
relieve at the will or caprice of the father or mother'
However, a
father is not presumed to have abandoned control of his child to others4Corrie v. Corrie, 42 Mich. 509, 4 N. W. 213 (1880); Page v. Page,
124 App. Div. 421, 108 N. Y. Supp. 864 (1908).
6hallcross v. Shallcross, 135 Ky. 418, 122 S. W. 223 (1909).
8 Weflesley v. Beaufort, 2 Russ. 1 (1827);
Anonymous, 2 Sim.
(N. S.) 54 (1851).
'Masterson v. Masterson, 24 K. L. R. 1852, 71 S. W. 490 (1903).
The court said, "Without going into detail we will say that appellant
presents circumstances and surroundings, while not reprehensible, indeed, rather moving one's sympathy than criticism, are such as to
make it very questionable whether it would be just to the child tochange its present home for hers."
'Ex Parte Hopkins, 3 P. Wins. 152 (1732); In re McGrath, 1 Ch.
143 (1893); Reg. v. Gyngafl, 2 Q. B. 232 (1893); Goerlitz v. Barney,
4 3rewst. (Pa.) 408 (1872); Jamison v. Gilbert, 30 Okla. 751, 135 Pac.
342 (1913).
'Kearney v. Steele, 121 La. 215, 46 So. 215 (1908).
20Tillman v. Tillman, 84 S. C. 552, 66 S. E. 1049 (1910).
1 Stapleton v. Poynter, 111 Ky. 264, 62 S. W. 730 (1901).
32Anderson
v. Young, 54 S. C. 388, 32 S. E. 448 (1899).
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where he periodically contributes to Its support." A contract made
by a mother on her deathbed with assent of the father, by which
custody of the children was given to relatives of the mother, was
held to be void as against public policy.' A father who is not shown
to have forfeited his right, has a right to the custody of his minor
child as against the world," and as against strangers, the father may
claim no matter how poor and humble, if he is of good moral character." An early case shows a logical exception to this rule. A man
permitted the custody of his infant child to pass in accordance with
his wife's will, to her sisters, and allowed the child to remain with
them and be reared and trained by them for 5 or 6 years. The court
held that he was not allowed to reassert his right of custody because
it was not for the best interest of the child if he did so.
It is natural and proper that a parent, being the logical guardian
of the child, should be given its custody as against guardians appointed by the court, or by other persons. Next to the parents come
the relatives. An early case held differently and decided that custody
of the infant could not be taken from the guardian appointed by will
8
of the parent, and be placed with the grandparents of the child.
The parents may often make mistakes in disposing of the custody of
their children. Equity has jurisdiction to place the child where its
welfare and best interests are protected. Kentucky has held that
nothing short of statutory inhibition will abridge the power of the
chancellor to award custody of an infant to whomsoever its welfare
and happiness demand." This decision does not mean, however, that
Kentucky holds the rights of the statutory guardian superior to that
of the parents. As between" the two, if the parent is moral and competent, he is given personal custody even though the guardian may
have control over the disposition of the child's property."
It has been generally held that guardianship proceedings which
oust a parent of custody of a minor child without notice and an appeal to be heard, do not preclude the parent. In Mahan v. Steele," a
Kentucky decision, it was decided that the county court had jurisdiction of appointment and removal of guardians without filing.of any
petition or issuance of summons, and that the appointment of a guardian without notice to the parent was valid. This decision is way
out of line and seems unconstitutional in that it robs a parent of his
child without due process. The best rule is that appointment of a
"Hibbetts v. Baines, 78 Miss. 695, 29 So. 80 (1900).
"See note 13, supra.
"Stafford v. Stafford, 299 Ill. 438, 132 N. E. 452 (1921).
"OHernandezv. Thomas, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 203, 39 So. 641 (1905).
1 Stringfellow v. Somerville, 95 Va. 701, 29 S. E. 685 (1898).
"Re E. F. Young, et al., (N. C.) 36 L. R. A. 224 (1897).
2"Workman v. Workman, 191 Ky. 124, 229 S. W. 379 (1921).
"*Mason v. Williams, 165 Ky. 331, 176 S. W. 1171 (1915).
"Re Van Vranken, 50 Hun. 607, 37 N. Y. S. 445 (1888); Corwin's
Appeal, 126 Pa. 326, 19 Atl. 38 (1889); Bioni v. Hazelton, 99 Vt. 453,
134 Atl. 606 (1926).
109 Ky. 31, 58 S. W. 446 (1900).

K. L. J.-9
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guardian Dy a county court is not conclusive as against a parent's
right to custody of his children unless it appears he had notice of the
proceedings and that the question of his competency was adjudicated.2
In Kentucky it Is provided by statute that the guardian shall have
custody of his ward.U In construing this statute the courts first considered the welfare of the child. In Bishop v. Bishop,Z it was held
that equity has power to determine the right of actual control and
custody of an infant in the legal custody of an appointed guardian.
In the recent Kentucky case of Fletcher v. Lippert's Guardian," the
maternal grandparents were held entitled to custody of a five-year old
child as against the child's statutory guardian, where the mother before her death requested the grandparents to rear the child together
with the mother's other two children and where the grandparents had
given the child very good care and were devoted to it.
It is readily, seen from this brief survey that no longer is the
parent the absolute ruler of the destinies of the child, but that In the
final analysis, the courts have assumed this position, and rightly so.
They have considered, not the desires of the parents altogether, but
rather, the welfare of the child. In so considering such welfare they
have perhaps infringed upon the old common law ideas of family
privileges. It is most logical that the state, through its judiciary should
care for and protect children when the natural parents are unable
or unfit to do so.
DEaoiw DuWEEss.

2 Clarke v. Lyon, 82 Neb. 625, 118 N. W. 472 (1908); Bryant V.
Duklehart, 106 Or. 359, 210 Pac. 454 (1923).
Ky. Statutes, Sec. 2032.
238 Ky. 702, 38 S. W. (2d) 657 (1931).
251 Ky. 469, 65 q. W. (2d) 250 (1933).

